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This paper deals with the modeling and computation of in-service aircraft reliability at the 
preliminary design stage. This problem is crucial for aircraft designers because it enables them to 
evaluate in-service interruption rates, in view of designing the system and of optimizing aircraft 
support. In the context of a sequence of flight cycles, standard reliability methods are not 
computationally conceivable with respect to industrial timing constraints. In this paper, first we 
construct the mathematical framework of in-service aircraft reliability.  Second, we use this model in 
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order to demonstrate recursive formulae linking the probabilities of the main failure events.  Third, 
from these analytic developments, we derive relevent reliability bounds. We use these bounds to 
design an efficient algorithm to estimate operational interruption rate indicators. Finally, we show 
the usefulness of our approach on real-world cases provided by Airbus. 
Keywords: Aircraft reliability, fault trees, reliability modeling, repairable system. 
List of notation 
ADM  Accepted Degraded Mode  
BA  Bound Algorithm 
DM  Degraded Mode 
OI  Operational Interruption 
OR  Operational Reliability 
RDM  Refused Degraded Mode 
NG  No Go dispatch condition on the system 
T  Index of cycle 
S  The (finite) set of all components within the system 
n  Number of components in S 
k  Number of minimal cuts 
iMC   ith Minimal Cut, ki ≤≤1  
i
TMC    The event that all components of 
iMC  are failed at the end of cycle T 
p  Number of minimal paths 
jMP    jth Minimal Path, pj ≤≤1  
j
TMP   The event that all components of 
jMP  work at the end of cycle T 
TNG   The event that a No Go dispatch condition occurs during cycle T 
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TxD   The event that component x works at the Departure (beginning) of 
cycle T  
TxF   The event that component x Fails during cycle T 
TADM   The event that the airline Accepts the Degraded Mode for take-off at 
the beginning of cycle T+1 
TRDM   The event that the airline Refuses the Degraded Mode for take-off at 
the beginning of cycle T+1 
E   Complement of event E 
}{EP   Probability of event E 
( )EUB   Upper Bound for }{EP  
( )ELB   Lower Bound for }{EP  
k-out-of-n:F system An n-component system that fails if and only if at least k 
components fail 
 
1.   Introduction 
In-service aircraft reliability relates to aircraft availability and punctuality. It measures 
the frequency of unscheduled service interruptions caused by technical failures and 
associated required maintenance. The different interruption types are:  
• delays at take-off (the aircraft departs later than the scheduled departure 
time), 
•  flight cancellations (the aircraft does not depart at all), 
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•  air diversions (the aircraft has to land at an airport different from its 
destination), 
•  in-flight turn-backs (the aircraft has to return to its departure airport). 
For airlines, these unscheduled service interruptions induce high direct costs related to 
the aircraft: fuel consumption, airport taxes, flight crew accommodation / duty time, 
passenger accommodation, financial compensation, etc. They also induce high indirect 
costs: loss of image, impact on customer loyalty, etc. Thus, in-service aircraft reliability 
is closely monitored by airlines and, therefore, also by aircraft manufacturers. As a 
consequence, in-service aircraft reliability has become a major target for aircraft 
designers. 
At the preliminary design stage, predicting accurate levels of an aircraft future in-service 
reliability is a key issue. This allows optimizing system design for targeted support 
performances. This prediction involves computing system failure probabilities, which 
requires the modeling and analysis of a dynamic process using a fault-tree analysis at 
each flight cycle1. Previous methods for computing these failure probabilities include the 
following: Markov processes2, Monte-Carlo simulation, dynamic fault trees and multi-
state systems. Because of the explosion of the number of possible states of the system, 
Markov processes3 cannot be considered here. On the other hand, Monte-Carlo 
simulation4,5 requires too many simulations to obtain sufficient precision. Indeed, in our 
context the interruption rate probability is between 10-7 and 10-4 per take-off. Despite 
recent progress on dynamic fault trees6 and multi-state systems7, these two approaches 
cannot be applied because the CPU time required to extract all the minimal sequences is 
unmanageable (there can be up to 1,600 flight cycles during one year of aircraft use). The 
lack of general tractable methods for large-scale dynamic models has yielded analytical 
developments for specific problems8,9. However, these results do not apply to our 
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aeronautical reliability problem, which involves a long sequence of flight cycles with 
dynamic dependencies between component states due to maintenance strategies. 
The contribution of the present paper relates to three aspects of in-service aircraft 
reliability: modeling, efficient resolution, and validation. It is organized as follows.  In 
Section 2, we develop the framework of the in-service aircraft reliability problem in the 
context of preliminary design.  Our model describes both the different failure modes of 
an aircraft system during its successive flight and ground phases, and the way airlines 
manage these failures. In Section 3, we derive recursive formulae linking the probabilities 
of the main failure events. This allows us to construct an efficient algorithm that provides 
relevant bounds for operational interruption rate indicators that meets industrial time 
constraints. Section 4 reports computational experiments on a k-out-of-n:F system, on an 
Air Data Inertial Reference System, and on an aircraft refuel system.  These results show 
the efficiency and precision of our approach.  We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2.   Model Formulation 
In this section, we first present the framework of the in-service aircraft reliability 
problem.  Then, we list the input data and the assumptions of the model.  
2.1.   Framework 
In service, an aircraft is subject to a sequence of cycles with each cycle consisting of a 
flight phase, followed by a ground phase (which then precedes the next flight). Here we 
consider an aircraft system made up of a number of various components. During any 
phase, a component failure may occur. Fig. 1 illustrates the main events that may occur in 
a sequence of cycles. 
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Fig. 1. Operational profile 
When a component x fails during cycle T, it may cause the system not to meet the 
dispatch conditions (safety, operability, commercial...), so-called No Go dispatch 
conditions (NG). Formally the occurrence of a NG event is represented by a fault tree, 
which is based solely on the component states (working or failed). In the case of NG 
during cycle T, the airline must repair all the components in a state of failure.  When a 
component x fails without involving NG, then two decisions can be made by the airline. 
Either the airline decides to take off in a so-called Accepted Degraded Mode (ADM), or it 
refuses the degraded mode (RDM), and then repairs the component that has just failed 
during cycle T, and does not repair any previously failed component. Note that if a 
degraded mode is accepted, some minor maintenance tasks configure the component that 
has just failed. Fig. 2 illustrates all of these different scenarios in detail. 
 
Fig. 2. The different possible scenarios during a cycle 
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From the two possible states of any given component x at the departure of cycle T: x 
works ( TxD ) or x is failed ( TxD ), we display in Fig. 3 all the events that may occur 
within cycle T. 
 
Fig. 3. The event tree for component x during cycle T. 
 
2.2.   Input data 
Here is the input data (known quantities) of the in-service aircraft reliability problem: 
• A coherent fault tree of the system.  This fault tree is issued from the system 
architecture by design engineers. 
• { }TT xDxFPr , the probability that component x fails during cycle T, given that 
x works at the beginning of cycle T. This quantity is a direct function of the 
failure rate of component x, which is provided by the component manufacturer. 
• { }TTTT xDxFNGADM ∩∩Pr , the probability of accepting the degraded 
mode, given that x fails during cycle T and that no TNG  (i.e. TNG ) occurs. 
This quantity is a direct function of the pilot behavior and of the airline 
 8 
maintenance strategy.  It is not a function of the component (see Assumption A7 
below). 
Note that, due to TNG event, ADMT (Accepted Degraded Mode) is not the 
complement event of RDMT (Refused Degraded Mode).  However, ADMT and 
RDMT  are conditional complement events, more precisely: 
 
{ } { }TTTTTTTT xDxFNGRDMxDxFNGADM ∩∩−=∩∩ Pr1Pr . 
• The initial conditions are also given: we know the state or the probability 
{ }1Pr xD of each component x at the beginning of cycle 1. 
2.3.   List of assumptions 
Here, we list the assumptions induced by both the airline maintenance strategy and the 
reliability of aircraft systems.  
A1. Given the states (working or failed) of each component at the beginning of the 
cycle T, the component probabilities of failure are independent.  
More precisely, the conditional probabilities of failure are independent 
while non-conditional probabilities of failure are not. In fact the dependencies 
between failure events are due to the NG event occurrence. 
A2. The probability of having more than one component failure during each cycle 
for the system under study is negligible.  
Indeed, because our reliability study is dedicated to operational 
interruption rate evaluation and due to the fact that we have to deal with highly 
reliable components, the above probability is negligible compared with standard 
targets for operational interruption rates (see also Ref. 10 for detail on this 
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assumption). This fact is also confirmed by operational interruption rate 
estimation throughout airline maintenance data. 
A3. A component x is repaired at cycle T only in the following cases: 
a. NG occurs during cycle T and component x was in failed state at 
the departure of cycle T 
b. Component x fails during cycle T and NG occurs during cycle T. 
c. Component x fails during cycle T, NG does not occur during 
cycle T and the airline refuses the degraded mode for the x 
component. 
 
A4. When a component is repaired during cycle T, it is assumed to be working at the 
departure of cycle T+1. 
A5. In the cases of NG during cycle T, all the equipments failed before or during 
cycle T are repaired.  
A6. The degraded mode acceptance by the airline during cycle T (ADMT) can occur 
when both a component fails and NG does not occur during cycle T. Once a 
degraded mode has been accepted for component x, it remains failed unless NG 
occurs during the following cycles. 
A7. Given that a component has failed during cycle T without inducing NG, we 
assume that ADMT (the degraded mode acceptance event) is independent of both 
x (the component) and T (the cycle). 
Remark that his conditional probability quantity is in practice given by the 
airline maintenance strategy and by the pilot behavior. Note that due to the NG 
coupling effect, the non-conditional probability of the degraded mode 
acceptance depends upon cycle T, but is independent of the failed component. 
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A8. The airline refuses degraded mode during cycle T (RDMT) can occur when both 
a component fails and NG does not occur during cycle T. Once a degraded mode 
has been refused for component x, it is repaired and it is assumed to be working 
at the beginning of cycle T+1. 
A9. Given that a component has failed during cycle T without inducing NG, we 
assume that RDMT (the event that the airline refuses the degraded mode) is 
independent of both x and T. 
The strictly analogous remark of A7 for ADMT applies also here for RDMT. 
A10. The component failure rates are supposed to be different but independent of the 
cycle (constant through the sequence of cycles). 
A11. We assume the following negative dependency property: at the departure of 
cycle T, the probability that both components x and y are in failed state is 
smaller than the individual probability product.  More formally, let 
yxSyx ≠∈ ,, be two components. Then,  
 { } { } { }TTTT yDxDyDxD PrPrPr ×≤∩ .  
As a direct consequence, we have the following general result: Let Sx ∈ and A 
a subset of the remaining components ( SA ⊂ with Ax ∉ ). Then, 
( ) { } ( )






×≤
















∩
∈∈
II
Ay
TT
Ay
TT yDxDyDxD PrPrPr . 
Remark: this negative dependency assumption is also equivalent to: 
 For all pairs of components Syx ∈, ( yx ≠ ):  
 { } { } { }TTTT yDxDyDxD PrPrPr ×≤∩ . 
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The negative dependency property is a consequence of both the maintenance 
strategy (see Fig. 2), and the fact that we deal with highly reliable components 
(see Appendix for a detailed justification). 
3.   From analytic developments to efficient computation 
The objective of this section is to compute at each cycle T estimates of the probabilities 
of the main events displayed on Fig. 2: NG (No Go dispatch condition on the system), 
ADM (Accepted Degraded Mode), and RDM (Refused Degraded Mode), which are in-
service aircraft reliability indicators at the preliminary design stage.  We present our 
methodology for computing these probabilities in four steps. In Subsection 3.1, we 
develop recursive analytical formulae (from cycle T to cycle T+1) for the three main-
event probabilities { }TNGPr , { }TADMPr , and { }TRDMPr . However, these 
formulae rely on two probabilities that are not computationally tractable for real-world 
aeronautical systems. Thus, in Subsection 3.2 we develop astute bounds on probabilities 
related to minimal sets of the NG fault tree. These bounds, in turn, allow us in Subsection 
3.3 to derive a bounding methodology for the above conditional NG event probabilities. 
Finally, we put these results together in Subsection 3.4 to derive an overall iterative 
scheme based on the initial conditions (at cycle T=1) and input data, in order to obtain an 
algorithm, called BA, for computing tight bounds for the three main-event probabilities.  
This algorithm does not rely on dynamic fault-tree analysis, and therefore it meets 
industrial computational time constraints for the systems considered in preliminary 
design. 
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3.1.   Probabilities of the main events: recursive formulae 
In this subsection, assuming that probability { }TxDPr  is given for all components x in 
S, we show how to obtain, from this information, analytic formulae of the main-event 
probabilities: { }TNGPr , { }TADMPr , { }TRDMPr , and consequently { }1Pr +TxD  
for all x in S. The latter probability will enable us to restart the iterative process. 
When a NG occurs during cycle T, a component must have failed during this cycle. 
Therefore, we have: 
( )U
Sx
TTTT xDxFNGNG
∈
∩∩= . 
Because the events { } SxTxF ∈ are disjoint (see Assumption A2), we obtain: 
{ } { } { } { }∑
∈
××∩=
Sx
TTTTTTT xDxDxFxDxFNGNG PrPrPrPr . (1) 
Similarly, for the second main event TADM , we have:  
 ( )U
Sx
TTTTT xDxFNGADMADM
∈
∩∩∩=  (see Fig. 3). 
This implies 
{ } { } { }( ) { } { }∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDxDxFxDxFNGxDxFNGADMADM PrPrPr1PrPr
.  (2) 
Again, from Fig. 3, ( )U
Sx
TTTTT xDxFNGRDMRDM
∈
∩∩∩=  and therefore: 
{ } { } { }( ) { } { }∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDxDxFxDxFNGxDxFNGADMRDM PrPrPr1PrPr
.  (3) 
Finally, in accordance with Fig. 3, we have: 
( ) ( )TTTTTTT xDxFNGADMNGxDxD ∩∩∩∪∩=+1 . 
Hence, the probability of component x not working at the next cycle, T+1, is: 
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{ } { } ( ){ }
{ } { }( ) { } { }.PrPrPr1Pr
PrPrPr 1
TTTTTTTTTT
TTTT
xDxDxFxDxFNGxDxFNGADM
xDNGxDxD
××∩−×∩∩+
∩−=+
  (4) 
 
Except for { }TT xDNG ∩Pr  and { }TTT xDxFNG ∩Pr , all values involved in the 
above formulae are known from inputs (see Subsection 2.2) and from the given 
probabilities { } SxTxD ∈Pr . The next two subsections will address the issue of bounding / 
approximating these two unknown probabilities.  
 
3.2.   Bounds related to minimal set probabilities 
The first step for bounding the two unknown probabilities { }TT xDNG ∩Pr  and 
{ }TTT xDxFNG ∩Pr , is to exhibit, for each minimal cut set iMC  and for each 
minimal path set jMP , upper bounds on events iTMC  (all components of iMC  are 
failed at the end of cycle T) and on events jTMP ( all components of jMP  work at the 
end of cycle T).  More precisely, we derive two types of recursive bounds. The first type 
is related to minimal cuts.  In Theorem 1 below, we provide bounds on 
{ }TTiT xDxFMC ∩Pr  and { }TTTiT xDyDyFMC ∩∩∩Pr  for all i, ki ≤≤1 , 
and for all components xySyx ≠∈ ,, . The second type of recursive bounds, given by 
Theorem 2, relates to minimal paths and provides bounds on { }TTjT xDxFMP ∩Pr  
and { }TTTjT xDyDyFMP ∩∩∩Pr  for all j, pj ≤≤1 , and for all components 
xySyx ≠∈ ,, .  All the upper bounds given by Theorems 1 and 2 can be computed 
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from input data and probabilities { } SxxDT ∈,Pr .  These bounds will be used in 
Subsection 3.3 in order to estimate the two unknown probabilities { }TT xDNG ∩Pr  and  
{ }TTT xDxFNG ∩Pr . 
 
Theorem 1. 
Consider the ith minimal cut, ki ≤≤1 , and two components Syx ∈,  with yx ≠ . We 
then obtain: 
i)    { }
{ }
{ }







∈≤∩
∏
≠
∈
;,0
,
Pr
Pr
Pr
otherwise
MCxif
xD
yD
xDxFMC i
T
xy
MCy
T
TT
i
T
i
 
ii) 
{ } { } { } { }







∈×










×
≤∩∩∩ ∏
≠≠
∈
.,0
,PrPrPr
Pr
,
otherwise
MCyifxDzDyDyF
xDyDyFMC
i
T
yzxz
MCz
TTT
TTT
i
T i
 
 
Proof. 
Let us consider the event that all components of the minimal cut iMC  are in failed state 
during cycle T. If iMCx ∈ and x has failed during cycle T, following Assumption A2, 
we neglect the event that more than one component fail during one phase, and then, we 
assume that all the other components of this minimal cut have failed before. Thus, we 
have: 
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If we consider the minimal cuts for a cut iMC to occur at T, a component 
iMCx ∈ must fail during the current cycle (only one according to Assumption A2), and 
the other components have to be lost at the beginning of the cycle T. Thus, this event can 
be rewritten as  
 







∅
∈∩∩










=∩∩
≠
∈
.,
,
otherwise
MCxifxDxFyD
xDxFMC
i
TT
xy
MCy
T
TT
i
T i
I
 
Let iMCx ∈ ,  
{ }
.PrPr
PrPr










∩










×










∩










=










∩∩










=∩∩
≠
∈
≠
∈
≠
∈
T
xy
MCy
TT
xy
MCy
TT
TT
xy
MCy
TTT
i
T
xDyDxDyDxF
xDxFyDxDxFMC
ii
i
II
I
 
The fact that { }TT
xy
MCy
TTT xDxFyDxDxF
i
PrPr =




















∩
≠
∈
I  is due to the probability 
independence of failure (A1). 
We use the inclusion of events 










⊆∩










≠
∈
≠
∈
II
xy
MCy
TT
xy
MCy
T
ii
yDxDyD  and the 
overvaluation of their probabilities that can be deduced. Hence, with Assumption A11 
(negative dependency) we obtain: 
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{ } { }
{ } { }.PrPr
PrPrPr
∏
≠
∈
≠
∈
×≤




















×≤∩∩
xy
MCy
TTT
xy
MCy
TTTTT
i
T
i
i
yDxDxF
yDxDxFxDxFMC I
 
Consequently, with the equality  
{ } { } { }TTTTiTTTiT xDxFxDxFMCxDxFMC ∩×∩=∩∩ PrPrPr , we 
conclude. 
ii) An analogous development of the previous proof is used to demonstrate the second 
overvaluation. 
Let SxMCy i ∈∉ , .  The cut cannot occur and we have: 
 ∅=∩∩∩ TTTiT xDyDyFMC . 
Let SxMCy i ∈∈ , .  The cut will occur if all the other components are in a failure 
state at the beginning of the cycle.  Thus, we have: 
 TTT
yzxz
MCz
TTTT
i
T xDyDyFzDxDyDyFMC
i
∩∩∩










=∩∩∩
≠≠
∈
I
,
 
Hence, if SxMCy i ∈∈ , , 
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{ }
{ } .PrPr
PrPrPr
,
,,










∩×≤










∩∩×










∩∩=∩∩∩
≠≠
∈
≠≠
∈
≠≠
∈
T
yzxz
MCz
TTT
TT
yzxz
MCz
TTT
yzxz
MCz
TTTTT
i
T
xDzDyDyF
xDyDzDxDyDzDyFxDyDyFMC
i
ii
I
II
  
The previous development relies on the fact that  
{ }TTTT
yzxz
MCz
TT yDyFxDyDzDyF
i
PrPr
,
=










∩∩
≠≠
∈
I  (from the probability 
independence of failures), and on the inclusion of the following events 
T
yzxz
MCz
TT
yz
MCz
TT xDzDxDzDyD
ii
∩










⊂∩










∩
≠≠
∈
≠
∈
II
,
 . 
Hence, with Assumption A11 (negative dependency) we conclude: 
{ } { } { } { }T
yzxz
MCz
TTTTTT
i
T xDzDyDyFxDyDyFMC
i
PrPrPrPr
,
×










×≤∩∩∩ ∏
≠≠
∈
. □ 
 
Theorem 2. 
Consider the jth minimal path, pj ≤≤1 , and two components Syx ∈,  with yx ≠ . 
Then, we have: 
i) { } { }



 ∈
≤∩ ∏
∈
.,Pr
,0
Pr otherwiseyD
MPxif
xDxFMP
jMPy
T
j
TT
j
T  
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ii)  
 
Proof. 
i) If we consider the minimal paths, we exploit the observation that one component must 
fail during the current cycle in order to prevent all minimal paths from occurring. Again, 
using Assumption A2, the other components necessarily work at the beginning of the 
cycle. Thus, for any component Sx ∈ , we have: 





∩∩








∈∅
=∩∩
∈
.,
,
otherwisexDxFyD
MPxif
xDxFMP
TT
MPy
T
j
TT
j
T
j
I
 
The next development relies on (the remark in) Assumption A11, and on the fact that 
{ }TT
MPy
TTT xDxFyDxDxF
j
PrPr =
















∩
∈
I   (from the probability independence 
of failures, Assumption A1): 
{ } { } { } { }







×








×
∈
≤∩∩ ∏
∈
.,PrPrPr
,,0
Pr
otherwisexDyDxDxF
MPxif
xDxFMP
T
MPy
TTT
j
TT
j
T
j
 
ii) We use a development analogous to that of the previous proof to demonstrate the 
second overvaluation. 
{ }
{ } { } { } { } { }












××





×
∈∈
≤
∩∩∩
∏
∈
.,PrPr,PrPrPrmin
,0
Pr
otherwisexDyDyFyDzDyDyF
MPyorMPxif
xDyDyFMP
TTTT
MPz
TTT
jj
TTT
j
T
j
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The event is divided as follows: 





∩∩∩





∈∈∅
=∩∩∩
∈
,
,
otherwisexDyDyFzD
MPyorMPxif
xDyDyFMP
TTT
MPz
T
jj
TTT
j
T
j
I
  
but we cannot apply Assumption A11 to conclude directly. 
On the other hand, with jMPyx ∉, , we have the following two inclusions: 
,TT
MPz
TTTT
j
T yDyFzDxDyDyFMP
j
∩∩





⊆∩∩∩
∈
I  
.TTTTTT
j
T xDyDyFxDyDyFMP ∩∩⊆∩∩∩  
From the first inclusion, with (the remark in) Assumption A11, we obtain the following 
overvaluation: 
{ } { } { } { }T
MPz
TTTTTT
j
T yDzDyDyFxDyDyFMP
j
PrPrPrPr ×





×≤∩∩∩ ∏
∈
. 
From the second one, we use the inclusion TTT xDxDyD ⊂∩ to obtain the following 
overvaluation: 
{ } { } { } { } { }TTTTTTTTTTTjT xDyDyFxDyDxDyDyFxDyDyFMP PrPrPrPrPr ×≤∩×∩≤∩∩∩
We take the minimum of both overvaluations to conclude.             □
  
Remark: For highly reliable systems, the second overvaluation is more efficient than the 
first one.  It corresponds to the following inequality:  
{ } { } { }T
MPz
TT xDzDyD
j
PrPrPr ≥× ∏
∈
. 
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3.3.   Bounds related to No Go dispatch condition probabilities 
Here, we show how to bound the unknown probabilities { }TT xDNG ∩Pr  and 
{ }TTT xDxFNG ∩Pr  of Subsection 3.1. More precisely, upper bounds will be derived 
in Theorem 3, using a minimal cut-set decomposition and Theorem 1 (Subsection 3.2). 
Then, using a minimal path-set decomposition and using Theorem 2 (Subsection 3.2), we 
shall derive lower bounds in Theorem 4.  Note that all the bounds on { }TT xDNG ∩Pr  
and { }TTT xDxFNG ∩Pr  given by Theorems 3 and 4 can be computed from input 
data and the probabilities { } SxxDT ∈,Pr .   
 
Theorem 3. 
For any component Sx ∈ , we have: 
i) { }
{ }
{ } { }∑
∏
=
∈
≠
∈
×≤∩
k
i
MCx
T
xy
MCy
T
TTT i
i
xD
yD
xDxFNG
1
1
Pr
Pr
Pr ,                   (5) 
 where { }


 ∈
=
∈
.0
,1
:1
otherwise
MCxif i
MCx i  
ii) 
{ } { } { }
{ }
{ } { }
































××≤∩ ∑ ∑
∏
≠
∈ =
∈
≠
≠
∈
xy
Sy
k
i
MCy
T
yz
xz
MCz
T
TTTTT i
i
yD
zD
yDyFxDxDNG
1
1
Pr
Pr
PrPrPr .   
                                                                                                                      (6) 
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Proof.  
i) Let us consider the failure of a component x.  In order to have a NG, at least one 
minimal cut which contains x must occur. Thus, using the general addition theorem 
bound and the fact that U
k
i
i
TT MCNG
1=
= , we have, for any component Sx ∈ : 
{ }
{ }
{ } { } .1Pr
Pr
PrPr
1
1
1
∑
∑
=
∈
=
=
×∩≤
∩≤






∩=∩
k
i
MCxTT
i
T
k
i
TT
i
T
TT
k
i
i
TTTT
ixDxFMC
xDxFMC
xDxFMCxDxFNG U
  
Hence, from Theorem 1, we obtain an upper bound for the NG probability given failure 
of a component Sx ∈ during cycle T: 
{ }
{ }
{ } { } .1Pr
Pr
Pr
1
∑
∏
=
∈
≠
∈
×≤∩
k
i
MCx
T
xy
MCy
T
TTT i
i
xD
yD
xDxFNG
 
Of course, we can also obtain an upper bound for the NG probability using the previous 
overvaluation and Eq. (1). 
ii) Based on formulation (1) of NGT event, an analogous development can be applied to 
the event TT xDNG ∩  to obtain the following overvaluation:  
( )U
xy
Sy
TTTTTT xDNGyDyFxDNG
≠
∈
∩∩∩=∩ . 
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{ } { }
( )
{ }
{ } { }
{ }
{ } { }∑
∏
∑∑
∑
∑
≠
∈
∈
≠
∈
≠
∈ =
≠
∈ =
≠
∈
×
















××≤
∩∩∩≤








∩∩∩=
∩∩∩=∩
xy
Sy
MCy
T
yxz
MCz
T
TTT
xy
Sy
k
i
TTT
i
T
xy
Sy
k
i
TTT
i
T
xy
Sy
TTTTTT
i
i
yD
zD
xDyDyF
xDyDyFMC
xDyDyFMC
xDNGyDyFxDNG
,1
Pr
Pr
PrPr
Pr
Pr
PrPr
,
1
1
U
 
with the remarks: 
• { } { }TTTTTT yDyFxDNGyDyF PrPr =∩∩   
• TTT xDxDyD ⊂∩  , which implies the overvaluation.              
□ 
 
Theorem 4. 
For any component Sx ∈ , we have: 
i) { } { } { }∑ ∏
=
∉
∈
×








−≥∩
p
j MPxMPy
TTTT j
j
yDxDxFNG
1
1Pr1Pr
                   (7) 
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ii)
{ }
{ } { } { }
{ } { } { } { } { }
{ } { }
.
11
PrPr,PrPrPrmin
PrPrPr
Pr
,
1
∑ ∑
∏
∑
≠
∈
∉
=
∈∈
∈
≠
∈












××








××







×
−
××≥
∩
xy
Sy
p
MPyx
j
MPxMPy
TTTT
MPz
TTT
xy
Sy
TTTT
TT
i jj
j
xDyDyFyDzDyDyF
xDyDyDyF
xDNG
    (8) 
 
Proof.  
Let us consider the failure of a component x.  In order to have a NG, all the minimal 
paths not containing x, do not occur at the beginning of the cycle.  
i) If we consider the failure of a component x, to have a NG, Thus, using the general 
addition theorem bound and the fact that I
p
j
j
TT MPNG
1=
= , we have for any 
component Sx ∈ : 
{ }
{ }.Pr1
Pr1
PrPr
1
1
1
∑
=
=
=
∩−≥








∩−=








∩=∩
p
j
TT
j
T
TT
p
j
j
T
TT
p
j
j
TTTT
xDxFMP
xDxFMP
xDxFMPxDxFNG
U
I
 
Hence, from Theorem 2, we obtain an upper bound for the NG probability given failure 
of a component Sx ∈ during cycle T: 
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{ } { } { }.1Pr1Pr
1
∑ ∏
=
∉
∈
×








−≥∩
p
j MPxMPy
TTTT j
j
yDxDxFNG
 
ii) Based on formulation of NG event from Eq. (1) of the NG event, an analogous 
argument can be applied to the event TT xDNG ∩  to obtain the following 
development:  
TTT
p
MPyx
j
j
TTTTT xDyDyFMPxDyDyFNG
j
T
∩∩∩










=∩∩∩
∉
=
I
,
1
. 
From the fact that { } { }TTTTT yDyFxDyDyF PrPr =∩  (from the probability of 
independent failures), and using Theorem 2, we derive the following development: 
{ } { }
{ }
{ }
{ } { } { } { }∑ ∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
≠
∈
∉
=
≠
∈
∉
=
≠
∈
∉
=
≠
∈
≠
∈










∩∩∩−××≥




















∩∩∩










−∩∩=










∩∩∩=
∩∩∩=
∩∩∩=∩
xy
Sy
p
MPyx
j
TTT
j
TTTTT
xy
Sy
TTT
p
MPyx
j
j
TTTT
xy
Sy
TTT
p
MPyx
j
j
T
xy
Sy
TTTT
xy
Sy
TTTTTT
j
j
j
xDyDyFMPxDyDyDyF
xDyDyFMPxDyDyF
xDyDyFMP
xDyDyFNG
xDyDyFNGxDNG
,
1
,
1
,
1
PrPrPrPr
PrPr
Pr
Pr
PrPr
U
I
  □ 
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3.4.   The Bound Algorithm (BA) for computing operational interruption rate 
indicators 
In this Subsection, we present recursive formulae for evaluating (lower and upper) 
bounds on probabilities of the three main events: TNG  (a No Go dispatch condition 
occurs during cycle T), TADM  (the airline Accepts the Degraded Mode for take-off at 
the beginning of cycle T+1), and TRDM  (the airline Refuses the Degraded Mode for 
take-off at the beginning of cycle T+1) at each cycle T.   These formulae derive from the 
recursive equation (4) of Subsection 3.1 and from the bounds provided by Theorems 3 
and 4.  These main event probability bounds can easily be computed from the given input 
data (including the given initial conditions at cycle 1, { }1Pr xD , for all component x in 
S.---see Subsection 2.2). From a straightforward application of Bayes rule, we obtain the 
following formulae: 
( ) ( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩=
Sx
TTTTTTT xDUBxDxFxDxFNGUBNGUB Pr  
( ) ( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩=
Sx
TTTTTTT xDLBxDxFxDxFNGLBNGLB Pr  
( ) { } ( )( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDUBxDxFxDxFNGLBxDxFNGADMADMUB Pr1Pr
 
( ) { } ( )( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDLBxDxFxDxFNGUBxDxFNGADMADMLB Pr1Pr
 
( ) { }( ) ( )( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩−=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDUBxDxFxDxFNGLBxDxFNGADMRDMUB Pr1Pr1
 
( ) { }( ) ( )( ) { } ( )∑
∈
××∩−×∩∩−=
Sx
TTTTTTTTTTT xDLBxDxFxDxFNGUBxDxFNGADMRDMLB Pr1Pr1
where:  
 26 
( )
( )
( ) { }∑
∏
=
∈
≠
∈
×=∩
k
i
MCx
T
xy
MCy
T
TTT i
i
xDLB
yDUB
xDxFNGUB
1
1
  
is obtained from inequality (5), and 
 
( ) ( ) { }∑ ∏
=
∉
∈
×−=∩
p
j
MPx
MPy
TTTT j
j
yDUBxDxFNGLB
1
11
 
is obtained from inequality (7). 
The above bounds on the three main-event probabilities can be computed from input data, 
because ( )TxDUB , ( )TxDUB , ( )TxDLB , and ( )TxDLB  are easily obtained for all 
component  x in S.  Indeed, for ( )1+TxDUB   and ( )1+TxDLB , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
{ } ( )( ) { } ( )TTTTTTTTTT
TTTT
xDUBxDxFxDxFNGLBxDxFNGADM
xDNGLBxDUBxDUB
××∩−×∩∩+
∩−≡+
Pr1Pr
1
and 
( ) ( ) ( )
{ } ( )( ) { } ( ),Pr1Pr 1 TTTTTTTTTT
TTTT
xDLBxDxFxDxFNGUBxDxFNGADM
xDNGUBxDLBxDLB
××∩−×∩∩+
∩−≡+
 
where: 
( ) ( ) { }
( )
( ) { }
































××≤∩ ∑ ∑
∏
≠
∈ =
∈
≠
≠
∈
xy
Sy
k
i
MCy
T
yz
xz
MCz
T
TTTTT i
i
yDLB
zDUB
yDyFxDUBxDNGUB
1
1Pr
 
(using (6)), and 
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( )
{ } ( ) ( )
{ } ( ) ( ) { } ( )
{ } { }
∑∑
∏
∑
≠
∈ =
∉∉
∈
≠
∈












××








××







×
−
××≥
∩
xy
Sy
p
j
MPxMPy
TTTT
MPz
TTT
xy
Sy
TTTT
TT
jj
j
xDUByDyFyDUBzDUByDyF
xDLByDLByDyF
xDNGLB
1 11
Pr,Prmin
Pr
 
(using (8)).   
Now it remains to consider ( )TxDUB , and ( )TxDLB .  Since 
( ) { } ( )TTT xDUBxDxDLB ≤≤ Pr , and because TxD  is the complement of TxD , we 
have: ( ) ( )TT xDLBxDUB −=1   and ( ) ( )TT xDUBxDLB −=1 . 
 
The above-presented algorithm, that enables us to compute upper and lower bounds for 
the three main events NG, ADM, and RDM at each cycle, will be referred to in the sequel 
as the Bound Algorithm (BA). The complexity of BA for a horizon of T cycles is 
( )( )pc pLmLnT +Ο 2. , where Lc is the maximum length of a minimal cut, and Lp is the 
maximum length of a minimal path.  This complexity largely meets industrial 
computational time constraints for the systems considered in preliminary design.  
Finally, remark that in our in-service aircraft reliability context, only upper bounds are 
crucial in guaranteeing system performance.  Nevertheless, lower bounds can give 
indications on the maximal error of the upper-bound overestimation. 
 
 
4.  Computational experiments 
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In view of its industrial implementation, we have to evaluate the practical relevance of 
our Bound Algorithm (BA). We will compare the performance of BA with that of the 
Markov approach. The Markov approach has the advantage of providing the exact 
solution, allowing us to evaluate the precision of BA and its relative efficiency. Due to 
the excessive CPU time required by the Markov approach, we restrict this comparison to 
a horizon of 100 flight cycles. This horizon is sufficient for industrial validation purposes 
because, in practice, predictions in aircraft reliability generally do not consider horizons 
greater than 100 cycles. 
For each application considered below, we start the process with all components 
working, i.e. { } 1Pr 1 =xD  for all x in S. We implemented both the BA and Markov 
approaches in MATLAB. We perform all computational experiments on a 256 Mb PC 
Pentium III running under Windows 2000 (except for some CPU-intensive runs of the 
Markov approach that are performed on a Sun SF6800 with 900 MHz CPU under Unix 
Solaris 8). 
Let us now report numerical results on following applications: standard k-out-of-n:F  
system examples, a typical Air Data Inertial Reference System (with fictitious data), and 
an aircraft refuel system. 
 
4.1 k-out-of-n:F systems 
In this application, the components of each k-out-of-n:F systems are assumed to be of 
identical independent distributions. The worst-case complexity for k-out-of-n:F systems 
is: O(n3.2n) for BA, against O(n.4n) for the Markov approach. We shall study all pairs 
(k,n) such that 122 ≤≤≤ nk . These values cover a wide range of k-out-of-n aircraft 
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system instances.  We choose { } 410Pr −=TT xDxF  for all component x in S, a typical 
component failure rate in aircraft reliability. 
In the computational experiments that follow, averages are taken over 100 cycles (i.e. 
100...2,1=T ). Table 1 displays the average BA absolute error of the upper bound for 
{ }TNGPr  (probability of a No Go dispatch condition during cycle T). The maximal 
absolute error value of Table 1 is 5.3E-4. This error is not significant because it lies 
completely within the reliability bounds of data uncertainties. The analogous results on 
TADM  and TRDM  are not presented because they derive directly from those on 
TNG , and are even much better in terms of performance (precision).  Our algorithm BA 
requires at most 258 seconds of CPU time, whereas the exact Markov approach needs up 
to 3,000 seconds.  
 
Table 1. Absolute error of the upper bound for k-out-of-n:F systems 
             N =  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
k = 2 1.64E-08 3.08E-06 1.21E-05 2.94E-05 5.72E-05 9.74E-05 1.51E-04 2.21E-04 3.07E-04 4.11E-04 5.33E-04 
k = 3  6.26E-08 3.88E-07 1.30E-06 3.23E-06 6.72E-06 1.24E-05 2.10E-05 3.32E-05 5.00E-05 7.22E-05 
 k = 4  1.64E-09 1.10E-08 4.11E-08 1.15E-07 2.67E-07 5.47E-07 1.02E-06 1.77E-06 2.91E-06 
  k = 5  3.82E-11 2.79E-10 1.15E-09 3.53E-09 8.95E-09 1.99E-08 4.01E-08 7.49E-08 
   k = 6  8.24E-13 6.63E-12 3.00E-11 1.00E-10 2.75E-10 6.59E-10 1.43E-09 
    k = 7  1.68E-14 1.48E-13 7.33E-13 2.65E-12 7.87E-12 2.03E-11 
     k = 8  3.25E-16 3.16E-15 1.70E-14 6.65E-14 2.12E-13 
      k = 9  5.75E-18 6.13E-17 3.57E-16 1.51E-15 
     
 
 k = 10  4.17E-19 4.53E-18 2.68E-17 
        k = 11  5.87E-21 6.95E-20 
         k = 12  8.21E-23 
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4.2 Air Data Initial Reference System 
To illustrate the efficiency of our BA algorithm, we consider a typical aircraft avionic 
system. The fault tree in Fig. 4 models it. It is a large system with 7 different types of 
components that correspond to 21 components, with 99 minimal cuts, and 3 minimal 
paths. Again, we choose { } 410Pr −=TT xDxF  for all component x in S. BA requires 
26.84 seconds of CPU time to compute both UB( TNG ) and LB( TNG ) bounds. The 
Markov requires about 51 hours of CPU time. 
 
Fig. 4. Fault tree modeling the No Go dispatch condition on Air Data Inertial Reference System 
 
Table 2 displays the difference between both bounds and the exact Markov results as a 
function of the number of cycles. Obviously, the maximal error is obtained for 100 
cycles. This maximal error of 1.45 % is completely satisfactory for predicting in-service 
aircraft reliability.  
Table 2. Absolute error of the upper and lower bounds for the Air Data Inertial Reference System 
Cycle T 1 2 3 10 30 50 70 100 
{ }TT NGNGUB Pr)( −  0 1.14E-
09 
3.08E-
09 
3.79E-
08 
3.14E-
07 
7.90E-
07 
1.39E-
06 
2.43E-
06 
{ }TT NGNGLB Pr)( −  0 -
1.34E-
09 
-
3.87E-
09 
-
5,37E-
08 
-
4,74E-
07 
-
1.23E-
06 
-
2.25E-
06 
-
4.12E-
06 
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4.3 Aircraft refuel system 
We consider a refuel system of an Airbus aircraft.  Fig. 5 displays the associated fault tree 
involving the 15 different components.  Here, we choose { } 510Pr −=TT xDxF  for all 
component x in S, a typical component failure rate in aircraft reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Fault tree modeling the Airbus refuel system 
 
After two weeks of operational use (100 cycles), BA obtained for { }TNGPr  (with 
T=100) the following results: upper bound on the No Go event: )( TNGUB  = 7.3E-5, 
and lower bound on the No Go event: )( TNGLB  = 6.2E-5. Our BA method required 
261 seconds of CPU time, whereas the Markov model needed around 2 hours (and 
yielded { }TNGPr  = 6.5E-5).  Again, due to real-world data uncertainties, this 
approximation is completely satisfactory for predicting in-service aircraft reliability. In 
particular, this Airbus refuel system case shows that BA is a promising method both in 
terms of precision and efficiency when applied to a real aircraft system. 
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5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we introduced a general mathematical framework for modeling in-service 
aircraft reliability at the preliminary design stage.  Then, we proposed an efficient 
algorithm (BA) to estimate operational interruption rate indicators which meets industrial 
computational time constraints for the systems considered in preliminary design. We 
demonstrated the precision of this method on real aircraft systems.  Note that, all the 
results obtained in this paper can straightforwardly be extended to the aging effect case 
with an “as good as new” maintenance strategy. For the sake of simplicity, we restricted 
our presentation to an elementary set of maintenance tasks: “removal” and “damage 
tolerance”. Current industrial implementation at Airbus does include other types of 
maintenance tasks (planned maintenance, preventive maintenance etc…). 
Future related work will attempt at extending our approach (model and algorithm) to the 
broader problem of aircraft punctuality by computing the probability of operational 
interruption. 
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Appendix A.   Justification of Assumption A11: 
{ } { } { }TTTT yDxDyDxD PrPrPr ×≤∩ . 
We shall show that this assumption is a direct consequence of the following two facts: 
{ } 0Pr >TT xDyD     and   0Pr 1 >












∩
∈
−U
Sz
TT zFyD ,   (F1) 
and       { } ( ) ( )( )1
1Pr 1 +
≤∑
∈
− TNTM
zF
Sz
T ,            (F2) 
 
where: 
( ) { }{ } 





=
−
≠
∈
TT
TT
xy
Szyx xDyD
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Due to the high reliability of aircraft components, (F1) and (F2) are always verified in 
practice. 
Proof of A11: 
Using facts (F1) and (F2) above, we obtain the following inequalities:  
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Then, from this last inequality, A11 is straightforward.   □ 
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